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lorkowski@computer.org, vladik@utep.edu
Abstract
Recent psychological experiments show that the feeling of awe increases people’s generosity. In this paper, we show that a usual utilitybased approach to decision making explains this increase.
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Formulation of the Problem

Recent experiment: a brief summary. A recent experiment [13] showed
that the feeling of awe increases people’s generosity.
Recent experiment: details. To measure a person’s generosity, researchers
use a so-called Ultimatum Bargaining Game. In this game, to test a person’s
generosity, this person is paired with another person in a simulated situation in
which they should share a certain ﬁxed amount of money given to them by the
experimenter:
• the tested person announces which part of this amount he or she is willing
to give to the second person;
• if the second person agrees, each of them gets the agreed-on amount;
• if the oﬀered part is too small and the second person disagrees, no one
gets anything.
The generosity is then measured by the amount of money that the tested person
is willing to give to his/her companion.
The gist of the experiment is that this amount increases when a tested person
has a feeling of awe, which is induced:
• either by requiring the persons to think about awe-inspiring natural scenes,
• or by explicitly showing such scenes prior to testing generosity.
1

Comment. It is worth mentioning that a similar increase in the transferred
amount of money was observed in a diﬀerent situation, when the tested person
was injected with euphoria-inducing oxytocin [7].
How the results of this experiment are currently explained. The paper [13] provides the following qualitative explanation of this result: that the
presence of awe leads to a feeling of smaller self. This, in turn, makes the person
more social and thus, more generous.
It is desirable to have a more quantitative explanation. The above
qualitative explanation is reasonable, but it is not necessarily fully convincing:
the feeling of awe cased by a magniﬁcent nature scene deﬁnitely decreases the
feeling of importance of self – but it also decreases the feeling of importance
of other people. It would make perfect sense if the feeling of awe led to more
donations to nature conservation funds, but why to other people?
What we plan to do. In order to come up with a more convincing explanation
of the above experiment, we analyze this experiment in quantitative terms, by
using the standard utility-based approach to decision making; see, e.g., [3, 10,
12, 14]. Our analysis shows that indeed, within this approach, the presence of
awe leads to an increase in generosity.
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Let Us Describe This Setting in Terms of UtilityBased Decision Theory

The notion of utility. According to decision theory [3, 10, 12, 14], a rational
person’s preferences can be described by his/her utility function, a function
that assigns, to each alternative, a real number in such a way that out of several
alternatives, the person always selects the one whose utility is the largest.
How utility depends on the amount of money. Experiments have shown
that for situations with monetary gain, utility u grows with
√ the money amount
m as u ≈ mα , with α ≈ 0.5, i.e., approximately as u ≈ m; see, e.g., [6] and
references therein.
So, if the given amount of money m is distributed between two participants,
so that the ﬁrst person gets m1 and the second person gets m2 = m − m1 , then:
√
• the utility of the ﬁrst person is u1 (m1 ) = m1 and
√
√
• the utility of the second person is u2 (m1 ) = m2 = m − m1 .
Comment. The speciﬁc dependence u ≈
based decision theory [9].

√
m can itself be explained by utility-

The dependence of utility on
√ other “units of pleasure”. It is reasonable
to assume that the formula u ≈ m describes not only the dependence of utility
on the amount of money, but also on the overall amount of “units of pleasure”
received by a person, be it money, material good, or feeling of awe.
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So, if we denote, by a, the amount of such units corresponding to the feeling
of awe, then, if the ﬁrst person also gets the amount of money m1 , the overall
amount of such units
√ is a + m1 , and thus, this persons’ utility is approximately
equal to u1 (m1 ) = a + m1 .
By deﬁnition, awe means that the corresponding pleasure is much larger
than what one normally gets from a modest money amount, i.e., that a ≫ m1 .
Eﬀect of empathy. A person’s preferences depend not only on what this
person gets, they also depend on what others get. Normally, this dependence is
positive, i.e., we feel happier if other people are happy.
The idea that a utility of a person depends on utilities of others was ﬁrst
described in [15, 16]. It was further developed by another future Nobelist Gary
Becker; see, e.g., [1]; see also [2, 4, 5, 12, 17].
If we take empathy
into account, then, instead of the original no-empathy
√
√
values m1 and m − m1 , we get values
√
√
u1 (m1 ) = m1 + α12 · m − m1
and
u2 (m1 ) =

√
√
m − m1 + α21 · m1 ,

where αij > 0 are positive numbers. People participating the above experiment
are strangers to each other, so their mutual empathy √
is not large: αij√≪ 1.
In the presence
of
awe,
we
similarly
get
u
(m
)
=
a + m1 + α12 · m − m1
1
1
√
√
and u2 (m1 ) = m − m1 + α21 · a + m1 .
How joint decisions are made. In the Ultimatum Bargaining Game, two
participants need to cooperate to get money. For such cooperative situations,
an optimal solution has been discovered by the Nobelist John Nash [10, 11, 12]:
a group should select the alternative x for which the following product attains
its largest possible value:
(u1 (x) − u1 (0)) · (u2 (x) − u2 (0)),
where ui (x) is the i-th person utility corresponding to the alternative x and
ui (0) is this person’s utility in the original (status quo) situation.
The fact that Nash’s bargaining solution can be used to describe such games
is emphasized, e.g., in [8]. In our case, the status quo situation is when neither
the ﬁrst not the second participant get any money, i.e., when m1 = 0 and
m2 = 0. In the absence of a, this means u1 (0) = u2 (0) = 0. In the presence of
awe, this means that:
√
• in the ﬁrst approximation, when we ignore empathy, we get u1 (0) = a
and u2 (0) = 0;
√
• when√we take empathy into account, we get u1 (0) = a and u2 (0) =
α21 · a.
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Resulting formulation of the problem. Now, we are ready to formulate
the situation in precise terms. We compare the optimal amounts m2 = m − m1
corresponding to two diﬀerent situations.
In the ﬁrst situation, there is no awe, so we select the value m1 for which
the following product attains the largest possible value:
(√
) (√
√
√ )
m1 + α12 · m − m1 ·
m − m1 + α21 · m1 .
(1)
In the second situation, there is an awe a ≫ m1 , so we select the value a for
which the following product attains the largest possible value:
(√
) (√
(√
√
√
√ ))
a + m1 − a + α12 · m − m1 · m − m1 + α21 ·
a + m1 − a . (2)
Let us estimate and compare these optimal values.
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Analysis of the Resulting Problem Explains
Why Awe Increases Empathy

Analysis of the ﬁrst (no-awe) situation. Let us start with analyzing the
ﬁrst situation. Since the values αij are small, in the ﬁrst approximation, we
can safely ignore
√ the corresponding terms and instead maximize the simpliﬁed
√
product m1 · m − m1 .
Maximizing this product is equivalent to maximizing its square, i.e., the
value m1 · (m − m1 ). Diﬀerentiating this expression and equating the derivative
to 0, we conclude that the maximum is attained when m1 = 0.5 · m and m2 =
m−m1 = 0.5·m. This is indeed close to the observed division in the Ultimatum
Bargaining Game [8, 13].
Analysis of the second (awe) situation. In the second situation, we can
use another simplifying approximation: namely, since a ≫ x1 , we can use the
√
df
fact that in general, for a diﬀerentiable function f (x) = x, we have
=
dx
df
f (x + h) − f (x)
f (x + h) − f (x)
. Thus, for small h, we have
≈
, hence
lim
h→0
h
dx
h
df
f (x + h) − f (x) ≈
· h.
dx
√
√
√
1
In particular, for f (x) = x, we get a + m1 − a ≈ √ · m1 . Since the
2 a
1
value a is huge, the ratio √ is very small, so, in the ﬁrst approximation, we can
2 a
√
safely ignore this ratio in comparison with the term α12 √
· m − m1 .√Similarly,
in the second factor, we can safely ignore the term α21 · ( a + m1 − a ) which
is proportional to this ratio. Thus, in this ﬁrst approximation, maximization of
the product (2) can be reduced to maximizing the following simpliﬁed product:
√
√
α12 · m − m1 · m − m1 = α12 · (m − m1 ).
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Among all possible values m1 from the interval [0, m], the largest value of this
expression is attained when m1 = 0 and m2 = m − m1 = m, i.e., which indeed
corresponds to the maximum generosity.
Conclusion: awe does increase generosity. As we have mentioned earlier,
generosity is hereby measured by the amount of money m2 = m − m1 given to
the second person.
We have shown that in the ﬁrst approximation:
• in the ﬁrst (no-awe) situation, the amount m2 given to the second person
is m2 = 0.5 · m, while
• in the second (awe) situation, the amount m2 given to the second person
is m2 = m,
In this ﬁrst approximation, since m > 0.5 · m, the presence of awe does increase
generosity.
Of course, there are solutions to the approximate problems, and thus, approximations to the solutions to the actual optimization problems. For the
actual optimal solutions, we will have m2 ≈ 0.5 · m in the no-awe case and
m2 ≈ m in the awe case. Thus, still, the generosity in the awe case is larger. So,
the utility-based decision theory indeed explains why awe increases generosity.
Comment. Since oxytocin also brings a large amount a of positive emotions,
this model can also explain the above-mentioned results from [7].
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